The second question is whether managers "matter" to the firms they run. In other words, do managerial styles constitute a value added 1 A large literature in management science has also looked at the role of CEOs, starting with Hambrick and Mason (1984) and Fligstein (1990) . See also Kotter (1982) , Khurana (2002), and Lazear (2004 Taking formative experiences into account does not mean that managers are merely the passive recipients of a style that is imposed on them. In fact, they might make optimal decisions conditional on having been exposed to a certain formative event. For example, a manager who starts his career during a recession might invest in a complementary skill set that allows him to deepen his existing knowledge and strengthen the image that the market has of his type. Thus, a recession CEO might seek to learn more about cost cutting and lean management, which might go well with the "frugal" image of a recession CEO.
Interestingly, we do not observe the reverse behavior in our analysis: we do not see managers working actively to undo the style predicted by their labor market entry cohort. If they did, observable managerial characteristics would not predict behavior. This is in line with a new theory paper by Dessein and Santos (2015) : in complex and uncertain environments, the endogenous allocation of managerial attention amplifies even small initial manager fixed effects.
II. Do Managerial Styles Matter?
We look at the event study returns to the appointment announcements of CEOs with different styles. To do so, we again turn to look at recession versus non-recession CEOs.
Our goal is to test how investors value the bundle of skills that recession CEOs bring to the firm. Since markets are forward looking and CEOs are not randomly assigned to firms, announcement period returns might also reflect the resolution of uncertainty about whether the firm would be able to hire a CEO with a scarce style.
III. Data
We start with the companies and CEOs We use value-weighted market and industry stock returns. All results in the paper are almost identical when we use equal-weighted market and industry stock returns. Results are also quite similar when we use a five-day (-2, -1, 0, 1, 2) announcement window instead. To decompose individual stock returns into a market-induced or industry-induced component and a firm-specific component, we follow the approach developed in Jenter and Kanaan (2015) . Specifically, we run a cross-sectional regression over the entire sample where the dependent variable is individual stock returns over the year prior to the CEO turnover announcement and the regressor is the market or industry returns over the year prior to the CEO turnover announcement. The residuals from these regressions are the marketadjusted or industry-adjusted individual stock returns. All results are quite similar when we define market-adjusted (industry-adjusted) returns as the individual stock returns minus the market (industry) returns or when we use firm-specific betas to do the adjustment. All results are also similar when we use unadjusted individual stock returns in the regressions. 5
IV. Results

To test how investors
The set of controls is measured over the year prior to the CEO turnover announcement and includes the following: the marketadjusted or industry-adjusted individual stock returns, market or industry stock returns, incoming CEO age, departing CEO age, the market value of equity, Tobin's Q, leverage ratio, return on assets and the average bid-ask spread. The regressions also include decade fixed effects (based on the decade in which the incoming CEO was born) and year fixed effects (based on the year in which the CEO turnover announcement is made). We perform several additional analyses.
First, the positive stock price reaction when a recession CEO replaces a non-recession CEO is stronger for firms with a worse (marketadjusted or industry-adjusted) stock price performance over the year prior to the CEO turnover announcement.
6 Second, the positive stock price reaction when a recession CEO replaces a non-recession CEO is stronger for well-governed firms. 7 This finding underlines 6 CEO turnovers following bad firm performance are termed "performance-induced turnovers" in Jenter and Lewellen (2014) . Jenter and Lewellen (2014) state that many turnovers that a standard classification algorithm classifies as voluntary (Parrino 1997) , are, in fact, performance-induced and likely to be forced. Kaplan and Minton (2012) reach a similar conclusion. 7
To measure corporate governance, we use the governance index developed in Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) . the idea that certain skills are in short supply in the market. In a well-governed firm, investors should have expected that the board would try to hire a CEO with the skill set the firm needs. The fact that even for these firms, the announcement effects of hiring a recession CEO is significant and positive suggests that investors are positively surprised that an appropriate individual was available in the market.
V. Conclusion
The results of this paper suggest that investors value the skill set that recession CEOs bring into their companies. It is possible that a board selects recession CEOs based on the firm's specific needs. However, if it were obvious that a firm would always hire a recession CEO when it has a specific need for this skill set, the announcement of such a hire should not contain any news for the market; all the potential performance impact should have been priced in previously. Thus, our results show that the announcement of a recession CEO hire is seen as unexpected good news for a firm, most likely since this skill set is in short supply in the market and the announcement confirms that the firm was able to hire this type of CEO. But it also implies that the market believes that this particular style has a value added for the firm. (1) vs. (4) 1.09*** 1.09*** (2) vs. (4) -0.73 -0.75 (3) vs. (4) -0.71* -0.78* Notes: We perform a two-tailed t-test of differences in means. Source: Author calculations. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
